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The inappropriate use, or overuse, of Lowest Price, Technically Acceptable 
(LPTA) procurements as a cost savings measure in federal acquisition offices can lead to 
failed projects if an exceptional solution is ignored in favor of the lowest offer, 
hampering the fulfillment of public policy initiatives. This category is particularly 
detrimental in solicitations for IT systems procurements, due to their complex technical 
nature. LPTA IT acquisition strategies have the potential to impede the daily work of 
government end-users across both military and civilian agencies, or curtail the ability to 
modernize existing capabilities to better serve needs at lower cost. If traditional, trusted 
evaluation factors like past performance and superior technical expertise are tacitly 
discouraged by the selection of LPTA, the government risks vulnerabilities in 
mismatched technical solutions, unanticipated long-term costs, or delayed procurements. 
In order to mitigate these effects, this study proposes and recommends the drafting of an 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance memorandum mandating an update 
to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) to clarify commodity thresholds, increased 
training, and the creation of a new role within all agency procurement offices to 
empirically track source selection category usage and contract lifecycle outcomes.  
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To: Anne Rung, Office of Procurement Policy, Office of Management and Budget 
From: Kate Hannon, Industry Consultant 
Subject: The “False Economy” of LPTA in Complex IT 
 
Action Forcing Event 
 
In August 2016, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) upheld the 
validity of protests by two major federal contractors, Booz Allen Hamilton and CACI, 
prospective bidders for a $17.5B Information Technology (IT) services Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA) contract vehicle titled ENCORE III. The two 
companies, backed by similar outcry from groups such as the Professional Services 
Council and the IT Alliance for Public Sector, denounced DISA’s plan to disqualify the 
lowest- and highest-priced bidders in two rounds of cuts as “irrational,” based on the 
lowest-priced technically acceptable (LPTA) designation of the solicitation.1 In addition 
to “arbitrary” selection criteria, IT industry protesters highlighted vague and 
indeterminate requirements, which rendered price estimation difficult and subjective.2 
GAO’s ruling likely signals significant rework for the Defense Department before a new 
solicitation can be released, adding further delay to the fulfillment of mission critical 
national security information sharing needs. 
Statement of the Problem 
GAO’s ruling is significant because it affirms the problematic nature of the LPTA 
award category currently in vogue in federal contracting, as established by the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The inappropriate use, or overuse, of LPTA procurements 
                                                        
1 Jared Serbu, “GAO Upholds Industry Protests in $17.5B ENCORE III Contract” August 4th, 2016, last 




as a cost savings measure can lengthen procurement windows, and lead to failed projects 
if an exceptional solution is ignored in favor of the lowest offer, hampering the
fulfillment of public policy initiatives. This category is particularly detrimental in 
solicitations for IT systems procurements due to their complex technical nature. LPTA IT 
acquisition strategies have the potential to impede the daily work of government end-
users across both military and civilian agencies, or curtail the ability to modernize 
existing capabilities to better serve needs at lower cost. Law enforcement agencies, 
research laboratories, legislative and administrative bodies, and troops overseas depend 
on reliable, secure IT development and maintenance to provide public goods and services 
to the American public.  
LPTA Fails to Account for the Requirements of Complex IT 
Mission inefficiency is exemplified by recent procurement delays associated with 
LPTA solicitations, as well as statements by high-level federal officials in both 
Congressional oversight and agency- level procurement roles. The lack of clear 
expectations common in such solicitations, bemoaned by the contractor protesters of 
ENCORE III, the months-delayed multi-billion dollar DISA solicitation mentioned 
above, precipitated GAO’s ruling in favor of the private sector. This represents a 
significant oversight rebuke to federal acquisition professionals tasked as gatekeepers for 
federal customers. Citing vague problem identification and requirements, protestor CACI 
alluded to long-term inefficiency issues that may arise if LPTA does not lead to a 
solution well matched to the mission challenge: “the development of sophisticated IT 
solutions and performance of the 19 identified performance areas in the PWS 
[performance work statement] all present significant risk of unsuccessful performance. 
3 
And because this RFP is intended to serve federal agencies across the government, the 
impact of unsuccessful performance is huge.”3 
In another instance, a Navy LPTA recompete procurement for an enterprise-wide 
network (NGen) meant to synthesize land and sea communications was delayed at least 
five months, due to the complexity of requirements.4 This following troubles on the 
initial contract, including delays, doubts regarding long term suitability of the technical 
solution, and expressed end-user frustration.5 In both examples, the government was at 
minimum forced to delay a contract award, if not completely overhaul the language of 
their solicitation. Such missteps unnecessarily delegitimize the federal procurement 
process, and undermine the type of innovative solutions made possible by the alliance of 
public sector mission and private sector expertise.  
Recognition of the Problem 
High-level procurement officials have asserted that LPTA is best utilized in 
procurements “of well known, low risk, common goods and services, but is rarely the 
right strategy for anything of even moderate complexity or risk.”6 In an especially high 
profile underscoring of LPTA inefficiencies, DOD Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall issued a memorandum in March 
2015 advising more limited use. Laying out appropriate prerequisite conditions for the
                                                        
3 Jason Miller, “LPTA Comes Under Fire from Congress/Industry,” Comstor Federal Online, May 9th, 
2016, last accessed September 28, 2016 
https://www.westconcomstor.com/us/en/comstor/comstor_home_page/programs/vertical_market
s/federal/federal-latest-news/2016/LPTA-Contracting-Comes-Under-Fire.html  
4 Jacques Gansler, Lisa H. Harrington, William Lucyshyn,“The DOD’s Use of Lowest Price Technically 
Acceptable (LPTA) Price Selection, Executive Summary” Center for Public Policy and Private Initiative, 
September 1st, 2013    http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/publications/dod%E2%80%99s-use-lowest-price-
technically-acceptable-lpta-price-selection  
5 Ibid. 
6 Stan Soloway, “Too Soon to Say Goodbye to LPTA?” Washington Technology Online, May 9th, 2016, 
last accessed August 30th, 2016, https://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2016/05/09/insights-soloway-
lpta.aspx 
4 
use of LPTA in source selection, Kendall’s high-level missive demonstrates an attempt to 
address an accepted problem within his purview.7  
The problem also appeared on the Congressional policy agenda in the April 2016 
when members of the Senate Armed Services Committee Mark Warner and Mike Rounds 
spoke out against LPTA and singular focus on price as a detriment to meaningful 
competition and innovation. They introduced bipartisan legislation that pointedly “directs 
DOD to avoid, to the maximum extent practicable, LPTA criteria when the procurement 
is for information technology, systems engineering and technical assistance, or other 
knowledge-based professional services.”8 
The False Promise of LPTA 
  LPTA contracts encourage a “race to the bottom” whereby companies are 
incentivized to bid low to win work, belying the actual relative value or business 
appropriateness of their solution on offer, or additional money the government may be 
forced to spend later if any changes to the Statement of Work (SOW) are made. LPTA 
decision-making does not reward technical innovation or past performance, because 
“evaluators have to turn a blind eye to whether past performance was excellent or barely 
acceptable—it must be treated as either acceptable or not acceptable.”9 These incentives 
are especially nefarious, for example, given the rapidly growing threat of cyber attack, as 
discussed in a June 2016 GAO survey of 18 agencies with high impact systems, which
                                                        
7 Frank Kendall, “Memorandum on the Appropriate Use of Lowest Price Technically Acceptable 
Source Selection Process and Associated Contract Type,” March 4, 2015, 
pghttp://bbp.dau.mil/docs/Appropriate_Use_of_Lowest_Priced_Technically_Acceptable_Source_Selec
_Process_Assoc_Con_Type.pdf 
8 “Warner, Rounds, Beyer, Wittman Act to Encourage Competition & Innovation in DOD Cyber 
Procurement,” Press Release, Website of Senator Mark R. Warner, April 21, 2016 
http://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ContentRecord_id=A4D27777-
C176-4924-970A-C72128D00A60  
9 Bob Lohfeld, “Is the Government Starting to Hate LPTA Too?” June 7th, 2013 Washington Technology 
Online, https://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2013/06/07/insights-lohfeld-lpta-shortcomings.aspx  
5 
collectively identified “cyber attacks from “nations” as the most serious and most 
frequently-occurring threat to the security of their systems.”10 The Obama 
Administration’s renewed focus on cyber security with the introduction of the 
Cybersecurity National Action Plan in February 2016 highlights the importance of 
quality, secure IT development in the federal space in response to increasing threat.11 
Though security is but one aspect of a successful IT system solution, it is increasingly 
crucial to the realization of modern public policy initiatives. If traditional, trusted 
evaluation factors like past performance and superior technical expertise are tacitly 
discouraged by the selection of LPTA, the government risks vulnerabilities in 
mismatched or delayed procurements. 
A Trend on the Rise  
Despite these risks, the use of LPTA in the IT sector shows no signs of slowing. A 
September 2015 report by Deltek identified growth in LPTA procurements for IT 
services, by 19% at DOD, and a whopping 222% in civilian agencies between FY2012 
and FY2014.12 Though agencies may decide to adopt this category in response to budget 
pressures, such efforts are nullified if an inappropriate match between vendor and 
mission results in costly, unplanned IT rework, or months-long protest and solicitation 
editing cycles as seen with ENCORE III.
                                                        
10 “Information Security: Agencies Need to Improve Controls over Selected High-Impact Systems,” U.S. 
Government Accountability Office Official Website, Released June 21st, 2016 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-501  
11 “Factsheet: Cybersecurity National Action Plan,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary Online, 
February 9th, 2016, last accessed September 16th, 2016 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2016/02/09/fact-sheet-cybersecurity-national-action-plan  
12 “According to Deltek Report, Use of Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) Evaluations are 
Declining Overall, but Increasing in Services and IT Contracting,” Deltek Online, September 18th, 2015, 




The Origins and Intent of LPTA 
 The category of LPTA as a criterion for source selection is enshrined in the FAR, 
a regulatory framework effective since 1984. The FAR seeks to standardize and govern 
federal procurement practices across agencies and departments. Prior to its codification, 
civilian and defense agencies did have defined regulations, however a 1972 finding by 
the Commission on Government Procurement suggested the proliferation of semi-
autonomous standards across departments constituted a “mass and maze…[with] no 
overall system for coordinating, controlling and standardizing regulations.”13 In 1979 
Congress passed the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, which jointly gave the 
Department of Defense (DOD), the General Services Administration (GSA) and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) responsibility for administering 
and amending the FAR.14 
 The problem with efficiency in the modern incarnation of LPTA as described 
above is poignant because the FAR explicitly defines its role to “deliver on a timely basis 
the best value product or service to the customer, while maintaining the public’s trust and 
fulfilling public policy objectives.”15 LPTA is one of two categories within FAR subpart 
15.1, “Best Value Continuum.” Government authors of Requests for Proposal (RFPs) 
must determine the relative importance of different proposal factors, including based on 
the good or service to be procured. A contractor’s past performance or the technical
                                                        
13 Kate M. Manuel, L. Elaine Halchin, Erika K. Lunder, Michelle D. Christensen, “The Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR): Answers to Frequently Asked Questions”, Congressional Research 
Service Online, February 3, 2015, last accessed October 2, 2016, pg. 10 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42826.pdf  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid,.pg. 9 
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specifications of a solution become more important “the less definitive the requirement, 
the more development work required, or the greater the performance risk.”16  If these 
factors are not expected to expose valuable differentiators among bidders, LPTA may be 
acceptable, otherwise a tradeoff analysis based on a set of weighted factors, where price 
does not play a primary role, should be implemented. 
Factors Contributing to Increased Reliance on LPTA 
 Both federal acquisition workforce management trends and budgetary constraints 
contributed to the rise of LPTA usage in the post- 2008 financial crisis procurement 
environment. Between FY 2008 and 2012, in the midst of global economic downturn, 
federal procurement spending dipped by more than 10%, forcing acquisition managers to 
consider best practices in the face of increasingly tight budget mandates.17 Selection 
processes where price is considered the paramount criterion require far fewer resources in 
terms of the number of acquisition personnel involved, the length of time expected to 
communicate and clarify requirements with private industry partners, and federal 
evaluators’ relative level of expertise.18 A risk-averse incentive structure within the 
acquisition workforce also led to a greater proportion of LPTA selections.19 It is in the 
government’s interest to avoid protests by bidders unsatisfied with judgments made by 
procurement personnel, since protests consume resources in mission wait time and source 
selection re-work, invite oversight scrutiny typically from GAO or other investigatory
                                                        
16 “Part 15 – Contracting by Negotiation,” Federal Acquisition Regulation, Acquisition.gov, last 
accessed October 2nd, 2016 https://www.acquisition.gov/?q=/browse/far/15    
17 Steven V. Reeves, “What the Acquisition Workforce Knows,” Defense AT & L Magazine, September-
October 2014, last accessed October 2, 2016, pg. 
25http://www.dau.mil/publications/DefenseATL/DATLFiles/Sep-Oct2014/Reeves.pdf  
18Kathleen Watson, “LPTA versus Tradeoff: How Procurement Methods can Impact Contract 
Performance,” Calhoun Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School, June 2015, pgs. 10-11 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45958/15Jun_Watson_Kathleen.pdf?sequence=1  
19 Steven V. Reeves, “What the Acquisition Workforce Knows,” last accessed October 2, 2016, pg. 24 
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bodies, and generally undermine the validity of federal purchasing. Price, if it can be 
successfully justified as the sole differentiator between bidders, came to be viewed a 
relatively objective, safe choice of criterion for procurement staff.  
 In response to a political and budgetary climate favoring sequestration, a 2010 
memorandum from then-Under Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter emphasized the 
pressures felt by acquisition offices in the federal landscape and implored them to 
consider cheaper options, ultimately bolstering the LPTA trend. He advised use of 
particular FAR categories to procure valuable services in the name of public goods, 
“without ever-increasing budgets to pay for them. We must therefore strive to achieve 
what economists call productivity growth: in simple terms, to DO MORE WITHOUT 
MORE [emphasis in original].”20 In subsequent official versions of Defense’s Better 
Buying Power directive, LPTA was called out as a viable means to reduce costs.21  
Such official directives, combined with the austere fiscal climate, facilitated the 
rise of stricter price-conscious evaluations. For example, in 2012 the Navy issued a 
recompete RFP for a technically complex enterprise network called NGEN, expected to 
fully consume 25% of the Navy’s total yearly IT budget. Industry observers noted the 
decision to choose LPTA as the selection criterion “unprecedented” for a system with 
such complexity and scope, reaching 800,000 users at 2,500 locations worldwide.22 A 
2013 publication by the Northern Virginia Technology Council cited LPTA as a growing 
“common concern,” and highlighted the dissonance inherent in the category’s use in
                                                        
20Ashton B. Carter, “Memorandum: Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency 
and Productivity in Defense Spending,” September 14th, 2010, pg. 17 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/fo/docs/USD_ATL_Guidance_Memo_September_14_2010_FINAL.PDF  
21 Steven V. Reeves, “What the Acquisition Workforce Knows,” last accessed October 2, 2016, pg. 24 
22 Jim Tinsley, Jim Thompson, “Helping the DOD Solve its Affordability Challenge,” Avascent Online 
December 5, 2012, last accessed October 2, 2016 http://www.avascent.com/2012/12/helping-the-
dod-solve-its-affordability-challenge/  
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complex IT: “originally intended to guide the acquisition of commodity services, LPTA 
has shifted into more complex fields….price, especially for non-commoditized services, 
shouldn’t be the driver.”23 
  Though data and dialogue on Defense-sector LPTA acquisition dominates the 
literature, a widely cited 2013 study entitled “The New Reality” captured its rise among a 
variety of agencies, as well as its disproportionate use in IT solicitations. The survey 
spanned 360 contractors and 375 federal employees, 56% representing civilian federal 
agencies, and aggregated counts of LPTA solicitations on FBO.gov, a trusted portal for 
federal business opportunity postings.24 64% of federal representatives indicated they 
were likely to issue LPTA RFPs, over half citing motivations based on cost savings and 
standard or mandated organizational practices.25 In a resounding indictment of 
procurement outcomes, only 25% of government employees and 12% of contractors 
reported a high level of satisfaction with deliverables obtained via LPTA.26 
Rising Criticism & Solutions Thus Far  
 A proliferation of official statements and think pieces from both private and 
public sector leaders starting around 2010 heralded LPTA’s contentious place within the 
acquisition world. In 2012, the National Defense Industrial Association spoke out against 
its excessive use, and drew a vivid comparison between the category’s original intent and 
its modern use: “while LPTA is adequate for “non-complex services” such as janitorial,
                                                        
23 Mark Toner, “Federal Contracting,” Northern Virginia Technology Council, The Voice of Technology 
Magazine, Spring 2013 pg. 24 https://www.nvtc.org/documents/magazine/Spring2013.pdf  
24 “The New Reality: The Impact of LPTA Procurements on Government Contracts and Solutions,” 
Market Connections, Inc. and Deltek/Centurion Research Solutions October 2013, last accessed October 
3, 2016, slide 15 http://marketconnectionsinc.com/wp-
content/uploads/stories/downloads/MarketConnections_LTPA_Impact_Study_OVERVIEW_111913.p
df   
25 Ibid., slides 20-21 
26 Ibid., slide 28  
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grass cutting and snow removal, it remains inappropriate for complex, engineering or 
technical services.”27 Contracting companies tend to be more openly negative in the 
literature regarding the upward trend, positing LPTA as a hindrance to the perpetuation of 
highly trained expertise, and by extension, delivery of the highest quality IT solutions to 
clients. Because IT projects typically require extended periods of operations and 
maintenance following initial system delivery, LPTA recompetes are especially 
nefarious. Industry leaders continually expressed concern that experienced personnel may 
leave due to reduced wages, and companies may not be able to remain competitive, even 
if they have proven their worth as the incumbent and can demonstrate strong past 
performance.28  
LPTA began to show up more frequently on industry lists of top trends in 2012-
2015, and consensus began to materialize which suggested LPTA in IT had not proven a 
cost saving strategy for the government. Industry leaders began to posit LPTA as a “false 
economy”: “in an overwhelming number of awards, the resultant contract does not meet 
the government’s expectations, often resulting in cost overruns, missed schedules, low 
quality output, and in some cases, contract stop work orders and new procurements.”29  
 The most visible acknowledgement of the problem from a high level public 
official came in March 2015, when Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall tapped into mounting concern, issuing a 
                                                        
27“The Growing Backlash Against LPTA Source Selection,” Law 360 Online, August 7, 2012, last 
accessed October 3, 2016, pg. 2 
http://www.brownrudnick.com/uploads/117/doc/The_Growing_Backlash_Against_LPTA_Source_Selectio
n.pdf  
28 Steve O’Keefe “My Cup of IT…Minimum Wage?” GovLoop Online June 29th, 2012, last accessed 2016 
https://www.govloop.com/community/blog/my-cup-of-it-minimum-wage/  
29 Steve Tolbert, “Five Strategies for Weathering the LPTA Storm,” WashingtonExec Online April 23, 
2014, last accessed October 2, 2016 http://www.washingtonexec.com/2014/04/guest-column-five-
strategies-weathering-lpta-storm-steve-tolbert/#.V_B3FKIrIfE  
11 
memorandum explicitly addressing the inappropriate use of LPTA. Kendall pointedly 
asserts that LPTA’s place should be limited, and, in a nod to the complex, mission-
critical work of modern IT systems contracting, stated the category was not appropriate 
“whenever the Warfighter is willing to pay more for above threshold requirements…and 
may benefit from an innovative and technologically superior solution to meet their 
mission needs.”30 By the time of Kendall’s agency-level directive, no significant 
legislation had attempted to address the issues described by both public and private 
entities in the name of improved efficiency and effectiveness. GAO rulings on protests of 
LPTA solicitations have tended to exhibit agency deference rather than pressing 
increased rigor in cost-based procurement source selection. For example, after 5 months 
of protest adjudication delays for the Navy’s NGEN solution mentioned above, the GAO 
ruled that DOD had sufficiently proven the reasonableness of the awardee’s bid price.31  
Background  
Legislative Climate 
Amidst rising concern voiced by public and private entities, the inappropriate use 
of LPTA and resultant inefficiencies were raised to the top of the Congressional policy 
agenda in the spring of 2016. In April, companion legislation was introduced in both the 
House and Senate in an attempt to combat the problem by directing DOD to amend the 
language of the FAR to include more specific language regarding acceptable use. Titled 
the “Promoting Value Based Defense Procurement Act,” the proposed directive explicitly 
and solely references LPTA and its perceived misuse. Citing the complex IT demands of
                                                        
30 Frank Kendall, “Memorandum on the Appropriate Use of Lowest Price Technically Acceptable 
Source Selection Process and Associated Contract Type,” March 4, 2015, pg. 2  
31 Government Accountability Office, Decision on Protest from Harris IT Services Corporation, B-
408546.2,B-408546.3, October 31, 2013, last accessed October 2, 2016 
http://www.gao.gov/products/D06304#mt=e-report  
12 
21st century federal customers, mounting concern over cyber security and the 
preservation of innovation in the private sector, bipartisan sponsor’s statements echoed 
the concern demonstrated by Kendall and industry leaders: “the current LPTA focus on 
price makes sense when the Pentagon is purchasing belts, bolts, and ballpoint pens, yet it 
provides no incentive for DOD to seek-out the most innovative IT and engineering 
solutions.”32 However, despite this Congressional push for solutions, the bills as such 
remain stalled in the introductory phase in both houses, signaling a lack of political will 
to move forward with even limited revisions to the vague FAR language currently 
enabling the trend. 
There are signs that policy makers are taking the concerns of IT contractors 
seriously. Following appeals by the Northern Virginia Technology Council, a large trade 
association that speaks for organizations in the federally-focused Northern Virginia 
region, changes to LPTA policy received high-profile praise from Senator John McCain 
in his capacity as Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee.33 Language from the 
aforementioned bill was incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017. This legislation, however, does not include a change to the FAR itself, 
which would have mandated change spanning federal procurement offices both defense 
and civilian. Section 847 of the FY 2017 directive “specifies that it is DOD policy to 
avoid using lowest price technically acceptable source selection criteria in inappropriate
                                                        
32 Senator Mark Warner, “Warner, Rounds, Beyer, Wittman Act to Encourage Competition & 
Innovation in DoD Cyber Procurement,” April 21, 2016, Official Website of Senator Mark R. Warner 
http://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ContentRecord_id=A4D27777-
C176-4924-970A-C72128D00A60  
33 “NVTC Applauds Senate Armed Services Committee’s Adoption of Warner/Round Language 
Limiting Use of LPTA Evaluation Criteria,” Northern Virginia Technology Council, last accessed 
October 15, 2016 
https://www.nvtc.org/news/getnewscontent.php?code=1120  
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circumstances that potentially deny DOD the benefits of cost and technical tradeoffs in 
the source selection process.”34  
The overall bill was met with contention from the Obama administration, which 
expressed displeasure with certain provisions via an OMB statement referencing the 
perception that the bill called for changes that would “micromanage” the Pentagon “with 
overly prescriptive organizational changes”.35 Embedded in the bill are calls for 
restructuring leadership, including eliminating Kendall’s current post in favor of two 
newly-created positions. The administration’s statement suggests a reluctance to tamper 
with or add complexity to the specifics of individual agencies’ procurement structures, 
echoing the deference enjoyed by DOD and others in LPTA-related GAO protest 
decisions.  
Acknowledging the notable lack of empirical data consolidation and analysis 
regarding LPTA usage and associated project success, the House bill also directs DOD to 
produce a report on 2015 and 2016 procurement habits. In addition to data collection, the 
bill specifies the need to survey acquisition professionals on their understanding of FAR 
best value criteria, and provide a breakdown of actual goods and services purchased using 
LPTA solicitations.36 The suggestion that more research is needed before backing more 
sweeping reform reflects the hesitation and ambiguity evident in some current LPTA 
literature on the scope of the problem.
                                                        
34 “H.R.4909 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017,” Congress.gov Online, last 
accessed October 15, 2016 https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/4909  
35 Charles S. Clark, “Senate Debates Defense Policy Bill Under Veto Threat, in Part for Acquisition 
Reforms,” June 8, 2016, last accessed October 15, 2016 Government Executive Online 
http://www.govexec.com/contracting/2016/06/senate-debates-defense-policy-bill-under-veto-
threat-part-acquisition-reforms/128919/  
36 Jared Serbu, “House Wants New Study of LPTA Contracts,” Federal News Radio Online, April 28, 
2016, last accessed October 15, 2016 http://federalnewsradio.com/acquisition/2016/04/house-
wants-new-study-lpta-contracts/  
14 
It is too simplistic to portray private industry and government representatives on 
opposing sides of the debate. However, at least within the public-facing debate, 
contractors and IT organizations have been more uniformly insistent that LPTA is being 
inappropriately applied. Government representatives, wary of ever-present public 
opinion, budget concerns and federal oversight pressure, have proven more inconsistent 
in their diagnosis of the current trend. Few policy leaders have directly taken up the 
mantle for change. Some argue there “is no LPTA mandate [driving excessive use], and 
the issue is somewhat overblown.”37 Despite relatively significant legislative attention 
granted to the problem within the past year, as of fall 2016 the Senate version of the 
FY2017 bill, despite progressing further than the House version, has not yet become law, 
stalled in the resolution of differences phase.38  
Acquisition Management & Workforce Incentives 
At the implementing agency level, defense-sector procurement leadership has 
been far more vocal than civilian in admitting the trend exists, may be harmful, and 
should be mitigated through formal clarification and acquisition training. Following 
Kendall’s 2015 memorandum, Claire Grady, Director of Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy, issued additional source selection guidance in April 2016 with an 
appendix dedicated solely to LPTA usage and thresholds.39 Procurement officials at the 
Treasury Department, following DOD’s lead, also issued clarification regarding LPTA 
applicability in April 2016. In a poignant nod to the mismatch of LPTA criteria to 
                                                        
37 Jared Serbu, “House Wants New Study of LPTA Contracts,” April 28, 2016 
38 “S.2943 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017”, Congress.gov Online, last 
accessed October 15, 2016 https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2943  
39Claire M. Grady, “Memorandum: Department of Defense Source Selection Procedures,” Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense April 1, 2016 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA004370-14-DPAP.pdf  
15 
complex IT programs, senior executive Iris B. Cooper cited the purchase of “copying 
paper” as an example of acceptable LPTA purview.40  
Yet despite high-profile missives, the root cause of the problem remains 
contentious within acquisition circles. A 2015 article by a representative of the Defense 
Acquisition University bristles at the demonization of LPTA as a useful category. 
Arguing the backlash from industry has not sufficiently distinguished between general 
use and more limited inappropriate use, the author insists the government “should not 
apologize for being concerned with price” when LPTA’s use can be justified.41  
The lack of empirical evidence regarding LPTA outcomes complicates the stance 
of acquisition shops, unsure whether reform would improve future project success and 
budget responsibility. In a telling question-and-answer session hosted at a Federal 
Acquisition Institute (FAI) seminar, one Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) 
expressed doubt on long-term efficacy: “[LPTA] is supposed to save us money but my 
experience has been otherwise. As a COR, we don't like the level of risk associated.”42 
The FAI representative’s response is worth noting in full, as a powerful insight into the 
incentives faced by multiple actors in the procurement process: 
The use of LPTA will continue and will likely increase as long as there are budget pressures. 
LPTA is one of many tools available to [Contracting Officers] COs, and used under the right 
circumstances, will result in best value to the government (risk included). However, it is important 
to educate your Government {Project Management Offices} PMOs on the program risks related to 
LPTA acquisition. The {Project Managers} PMs and COs need to align interests as the PM's 
interests include bringing in an operational program within budget while the CO’s interests 
                                                        
40Iris B. Cooper, “Memorandum: Appropriate Use of Lowest Price Technically Acceptable Source 
Selection Process,” Department of the Treasury, Office of the Procurement Executive April 18, 2016 
https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Mgt/Documents/APU%202016-
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include awarding a contract that saves money and avoids protests. We also need to emphasize the 
importance of good requirements definition especially in LPTA procurements. This is critical to 
ensuring that what is delivered is what was wanted. A government leader once told me, “When a 
project fails the PM and/or the Contractor get the blame - No one ever goes back and reviews the 
evaluation factors.”43 
 
Within this day-to-day operating environment, budgetary pressures for acquisition 
management and on-the-ground professionals have not significantly changed over the 
past year. Turning again to the 2015 Deltek survey referenced in the above section, it is 
clear that a majority of the procurement workforce foresees continued use, based 
primarily on the continued push for cost savings and subsequent ingrained pressures and 
messaging from management. The trend may be bolstered by a risk-averse culture within 
procurement offices. A 2015 survey of government acquisition authorities indicates COs 
may choose LPTA over other, less transparent forms of source selection in an effort to 
avoid costly protests. The efficiency of such tactics is questionable, as they may 
contribute to “procurements that are more complex, cost more (to both the government 
and bidders), and take longer to award.”44 
Some observers of the LPTA trend suggest the continued preference for LPTA 
selections undermines the long-term competency of procurement professionals related to 
complex IT. The simplistic nature of LPTA engenders a strict focus on pricing over other 
more technical factors. When considering which FAR category to choose, “a general 
discomfort with intimate knowledge of a requirement, in addition to limited time and 
resources to work on a single procurement when hundreds of other actions are standing
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by, leads acquisition teams to utilize LPTA over tradeoff.”45 The directives from Kendall 
and Grady could be read as a clarion call to managers to prioritize training in this area. 
However, the bureaucratic realities of resource constraint may inhibit implementation, 
rendering the most telling memoranda to ivory tower irrelevance. Alan Estevez, 
Kendall’s deputy, noted the difference between acknowledging the problem, and ensuring 
acquisition offices are practically capable of prioritizing policies on the ground, in a 2015 
interview: “the reality is that the contracting officers at an individual fort or air base may 
not know who Frank Kendall or Alan Estevez or Claire Grady is.”46  
Despite resource constraints, ultimately COs must be concerned with 
performance. Much of the evidence against LPTA is anecdotal and anonymous rather 
than empirical. This makes DOD leadership and Congressional acknowledgement all the 
more symbolically powerful, yet leaves procurement middle management with less 
incentive to change behavior. Ultimately, available qualitative evidence does suggest a 
long-term problem, most powerfully felt in aggregate, as described by late 2015 
interviews with federal executives, who note that a proliferation of IT system 
modernization and cybersecurity initiatives are driving harder choices about the impact of 
LPTA leading into 2016 and beyond. They note the inefficiencies of LPTA are most 
evident when for example, “industry is finding it hard to have enough staff based on the
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rates they bid to the government,” and “DOD is sending more “cure” notices telling 
contractors to fix programs.”47 
Oversight & Rulemaking Agencies  
GAO, in its capacity as arbiter of procurement protests, is an important player in 
the LPTA debate. GAO’s response leading up to the current moment has been 
characterized by deference to agency decision-making and justification. However, several 
recent rulings dovetail with the issue’s increasing salience.  
In late summer 2016, GAO ruled against the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) in the last of a series of protests of an LPTA solicitation for operations support for 
its financial management system. Though HHS claimed the awardee, Intellizant, LLC 
was selected based on its lowest price proposal, the solicitation was beset by three 
subsequent protests from incumbent Starry Associates, Inc, citing favoritism and other 
subjective behavior inconsistent with the intent of LPTA.48 Decrying HHS’ decision to 
cancel and re-issue the solicitation after the second protest, the GAO court issued a 
stunningly apologetic statement to Starry Associates, acknowledging their “considerable” 
investment of “time and resources in fighting the agency’s continued capricious 
conduct”.49 If the acquisition workforce believes LPTA will reduce the incidence of 
protest, as cited in the above section on federal incentives, such a ruling and attendant 
procurement delay should give pause. Even if such a ruling is anomalous, it nevertheless 
highlights a glaring weakness in the argument for LPTA efficiency.
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  The notable catalyst of this study, DISA’s ENCORE III procurement, is another 
recent example of a possible shift in GAO outlook. Their ruling in August 2016 in favor 
of protesting contractors Booz Allen Hamilton and CACI is widely cited in the current 
debate as evidence of such. Prominent industry leader Alan Chotkin of the Professional 
Services Council summarized GAO’s ruling, citing DISA’s “complicated formula” for 
award, again inconsistent with the intended use of LPTA for more simplistic, 
straightforward commodity purchases.50 The original RFP also acknowledged potential 
for “technology changes over time,” rendering the SOW difficult for bidders to 
conceptualize and accurately price, undermining the core of LPTA justifiability.51  
In mid-2016 DOD, to date the loudest sector proponent of LPTA reform, 
announced a new standard for competitive source selection, a Value-Adjusted Total 
Evaluated Price (VATEP) formula designed to introduce more objectivity into 
procurement processes, better define the relative value of SOW components, and avoid 
bid protests. Observers note that such a mathematical calculation still leaves room for 
human error, but may prove a smart play from agencies when they are asked to justify 
their contract awards to oversight and arbitration groups like GAO.52 Despite 
implementation in DOD’s procurement guidelines, such a formula does not alter FAR 
requirements, nor does it address inappropriate handling of best value solicitations in 
civilian agencies.
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  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), specifically the Office of 
Procurement Policy (OFPP) is also a stakeholder, given its mandate to ensure taxpayer 
dollars are well spent. Because LPTA use spans all agencies both military and civilian, 
OFPP’s role as administrator of “overall direction for government-wide procurement 
policies, regulations and procedures,” is singularly placed to guide government wide 
response to the problem.53 As early as January 2015, shortly after taking over as the head 
of OFPP, Anne Rung signaled both awareness of the LPTA debate, and willingness to 
work with industry to take steps to assist agencies’ understanding of best practices.54 In a 
cautionary and candid 2012 piece, an industry representative suggested OMB (alongside 
Congress and individual agencies) may bear special responsibility for stemming 
inefficiencies. The author highlighted the disconnect between official rhetoric and 
procurement office capability discussed above: “even source selection officials don’t 
have the necessary clout to overrule dictated overall budget reductions. Everyone is 
running scared. The required fiscal prioritization and cultural change has to start at the 
top.”55 
Sustained Private Industry Outcry 
Private sector contractors and IT experts continue to be the most vocal proponents 
of substantive change in procurement culture and rules governing LPTA. Motivations in 
the private sector range from profit concerns to mission-based worries about dwindling 
innovation and staffing capabilities. The continued choice of LPTA by procurement 
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managers forces negative private sector adjustments. Its emphasis discourages new 
companies, who lack valuable past performance that may outweigh pricing factors, from 
entering the market, if they want to avoid significant wage cuts for their staff in order to 
honor low bids.56 Despite opportunities for companies well placed to absorb the impact 
of smaller government budgets, 59% of government acquisition professionals, and 71% 
of contractors expressed “concerns about the trade-off of long-term value for short-term 
savings” in a 2013 poll conducted by Fairfax-based research firm Market Connections.57 
Indeed, DISA’s decision to disqualify the lowest tier of bidders to the ENCORE III 
vehicle may be indication of an attempt by contracting officers to mitigate this trade-off.  
Policy Proposal 
Authorizing Tool & Context 
In order to mitigate long-term inefficiencies of LPTA, the OMB OFPP should 
prepare and publish a policy guidance memorandum addressed to the heads of federal 
departments and agencies to mandate: 
• FAR amendments explicitly discouraging the use of LPTA for specified 
purchase categories including complex IT, by increasing the burden of 
proof for Contracting Officers looking to characterize IT purchases as 
“commodities”  
• new acquisition workforce training, and 
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• a new role within agency procurement offices to empirically link source 
selection usage to end-user outcomes.  
This guidance would be issued by the OFPP Administrator, acting in their statutorily 
enshrined role as chair of the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council. The details of this 
guidance would then be incorporated into the FAR through a joint effort by the 
procurement leads at DOD, NASA, and GSA, the three agencies tasked with amending 
the FAR.  
Policy Implementation & Key Points for Inclusion 
The following key points should be included in OFPP’s memorandum, based on primary 
drivers of the trend: 
• The letter should recommend sample language to amend or replace existing 
wording of LPTA thresholds and requirements as stated in FAR Part 15.101, 
Source Selection Processes and Techniques- Best Value Continuum. The current 
vague language should be updated to include explicit thresholds for complex IT, 
beyond which LPTA is no longer an acceptable choice. Specifically for complex 
IT, COs should be asked to consider the likelihood of requirements complexity, 
changing requirements over time, level of customization required by the end user 
and length of development time before solution delivery. If a system is expected 
to meet or exceed stated thresholds for each of these categories, the IT 
procurement will count as “complex” and would no longer be considered a 
commodity. This would ensure uniform standards of commodity comparison 
across federal procurement offices.
23 
Once guidance is issued by OFPP, the FAR Council would finalize language and put 
forth prospective changes for review and comment by “interested persons”, per 
statutory obligation under the Administrative Procedure Act.58 FAR amendments 
would then take effect following a 30-day waiting period after finalization.  
Training & Reporting 
• The memo must also address the heart of the LPTA issue: the acquisition 
workforce. As gatekeepers between federal technology end-users and the 
contractors providing solutions, procurement offices both defense and civilian 
hold enormous responsibility in an ever changing IT landscape, and must be 
equipped to handle the task at hand.  
OFPP should recommend training and work with agencies and departments to 
develop materials. COs should be encouraged to work with end users from the 
start of the procurement process to ensure proposal reviewers understand the 
complexity (or simplicity) of the technology solution sought.  
• While qualitative and anecdotal evidence of the problem abounds, OFPP should 
acknowledge and seek to remedy the relative lack of quantitative data to better 
inform the debate, following the precedent of the aforementioned 
recommendation within the Promoting Value Based Defense Procurement Act. 
Within 60 days, agency procurement offices should appoint a “Source Selection 
Outcomes Adviser” to manage this effort, tasked with reporting on a biannual 
basis to the agency procurement lead. This advisor will track the use of LPTA 
(and best value, the category’s counterpart in FAR 15.101) in IT and other
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procurements, and link usage to outcomes. Particular outcomes of focus should 
relate to customer satisfaction, any changes required to the original SOW, and 
other unexpected outcomes such as a contractor’s inability to deliver an adequate 
technical solution within the original solicitation parameters. 
Potential Costs of the Proposal 
In the short term, if workforce training and empirical analysis leads to more use of 
best value source selection as opposed to LPTA, agencies may incur increased 
procurement expenditures. Best value determinations, which consider criteria like past 
performance and technical solution in addition to price, are typically more expensive, and 
require more time and expertise from the acquisition workforce reviewing bidder 
proposals. As of 2013, the average cost of LPTA contracts totaled $18M per year, while 
the average annual cost of best value contracts was $38.8M.59  
Policy Analysis: 
Pros:  
The technical barriers to amending FAR language are relatively low and 
standardized. Suggested changes could likely go into effect within one year, based on a 
recent case study: in May 2016 the FAR Council announced a final rule codifying 
guidance on stricter cyber security contracting standards addressed in an OMB memo in 
fall 2015. The final rule accomplishes a similar aim to that expressed in this proposal: a 
new FAR subpart and new language to be included in contracts.60 As gatekeepers of the
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FAR, DOD, NASA and GSA follow standardized practices in introducing and soliciting 
feedback from concerned parties.  
In terms of costs, despite the potential for short-term doubling of expenses 
incurred by choosing best value over LPTA in more procurements, observers have long 
noted the real potential for long-term cost savings. The danger of LPTA misuse lies 
primarily in long-term effects, so increased procurement costs may be mitigated by 
increased technical value at the outset, and decreased incidence of re-solicitation and re-
work over time. In 2015 federal employees cited the following concerns about myopic 
LPTA preferences: “contracts may be awarded to less qualified companies,” “sacrifices 
long-term value for short-term cost savings,” and “acts to lower the contractor’s standard 
of performance”.61 All these observed outcomes add unforeseen, unbudgeted costs with 
the potential to outweigh the attraction of LPTA as an immediate cost saving strategy. 
LPTA’s façade of cost containment in complex IT was highlighted by the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in their early 2016 push for legislative change, citing the purchase of 
“sensitive electronic test equipment that are very technical in nature and require 
calibration, repair and software updates during their life cycle. Such long-term costs are 
not considered under LPTA processes, even though they may increase taxpayer costs by 
millions over the life of the equipment.”62  
This understanding of the false promise of lowest price solicitations was 
embodied in a 2013 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) procurement for cloud computing 
services geared towards big data and information sharing among the 16 members of the
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Intelligence Community (IC). The challenges of data privacy, access control, and high-
volume data analysis included in the CIA procurement echo the modern IT challenges of 
most federal agencies both defense and civilian. Eschewing lowest price in favor of 
technological innovation, the CIA chose Amazon Web Services over IBM, despite 
Amazon’s significantly higher bid, which surpassed IBM’s offer by $54 million.63 In 
selecting a superior technical solution that was built to adapt to the way the IC utilizes 
data, for example spinning servers up and down as users require additional resources, 
which is “expected to generate massive savings for the IC.”64 CIA procurement 
successfully weathered a bid protest from losing vendor IBM, and the system met initial 
operating capacity in 2014, an astonishingly fast time frame given the complexity of IC 
needs. In a telling statement rejecting the promise of quick savings like those lauded by 
advocates of LPTA, CIA Chief Information Officer Douglas Wolfe dubbed the 
procurement “one of the most important technology procurements in recent history,” 
citing his intention to prove “efficiency in terms of folks traditionally using IT now using 
it in a cost-recovery way” over time.65 
The chance for policy success is also bolstered by empirical evidence out of 
DOD, the agency whose procurement leadership has been the most vocal about the 
dangers of LPTA. Based on a 2015 Deltek study, the incidence of LPTA usage at DOD 
has not risen as quickly as the civilian sector in recent years. Complex IT in the defense 
sector has indeed received more of the spotlight, and ire, of private sector observers, who
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cite DOD contracts like NGEN and ENCORE III as evidence of misguided procurement 
strategies. This enhanced focus, which precipitated Kendall’s statement and the limited 
2016 Congressional push to acknowledge the problem, may have contributed to declining 
use, or at least hesitancy. Although usage rates rose in IT for both defense and civilian, 
the rate of increase is hardly comparable: 19% for DOD and 222% for civilian.66 
Attention, especially from key policy makers and oversight bodies, seems to be linked to 
more limited usage on this issue. Thus formal recognition of the problem by the 
Executive branch, and regulation that crosses all agencies and departments, may help to 
mitigate LPTA’s effects across the board.  
Acknowledging that contractor behavior has adjusted as a result of increased 
LPTA solicitations, and not necessarily for the better in terms of government end-user 
outcomes, would support the likelihood of policy success. An LPTA-centric regime 
incentivizes contractors to bid artificially low to win work, resulting in “in a solution that 
does not work, or assignment of personnel that are well meaning but too inexperienced to 
accomplish what is necessary… [and contractors may then] "change order" their way up 
to a higher price”.67 End-users of mission-critical technology lose when procurement 
practices incentivize this type of gaming of the system by those best positioned to offer 
solutions.  
Adopting a long-term outlook for returns on investments should lead to policy 
success in this area, and lead to fewer protests and projects beset by unbudgeted time and
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cost overruns. As suggested in a 2015 Defense AT&L Magazine piece, “[LPTA] is not a 
sustainable approach in the long run…without real productivity gains, “do more without 
more” becomes magical thinking enabled by short-term needs borrowing against 
long-term investments [emphasis added]”.68 The evocation of Ashton Carter’s 2010 
memorandum language serves as a reminder of the tradeoffs implicit in LPTA, 
particularly with complex IT. The empirical analysis mandated in the proposed OFPP 
policy directive would help to determine short and long term effects, and policies could 
be tailored over time in response.  
Cons: 
The largest hurdle to policy implementation would likely be the anticipated 
increase in short-term costs incurred by the government on an annual basis, despite strong 
voices in the literature that urge patience in light of expected long-term cost savings. The 
current fiscal environment and budgetary planning cycle leaves little room for the type of 
short-term cost increases noted in the policy proposal section; best value has proven more 
than twice as expensive as LPTA in the short term. Limited administrative capacity and 
ingrained risk-averse management incentives of procurement shops across the federal 
landscape may endanger the viability of limiting source selection options in the complex 
IT space. Reports suggest the same constrained budgetary environment will persist, 
incentivizing a management culture that rewards risk-averse strategies. LPTA is 
attractive because it requires fewer inputs in terms of time and staff expertise, and 
capitalizes on the objective criterion of price to avoid costly selection justification. A late 
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2016 report by Bloomberg Government describes the multi-year landscape with one big 
bottom line- the effects of post-2009 sequestration, which originally precipitated the rise 
of LPTA, will continue to impact procurement offices’ calculus through 2016 and 
possibly through the next decade. The rules of sequestration caps the rate of spending 
increase at 1.7% between 2014 and 2021, almost half of the predicted organic, 
unconstrained increase of 2.1%.69 The policy proposed here does nothing to 
incentivize an immediate change of heart in procurement management. It asks 
procurement offices to consider more nebulous long-term return on investment at a time 
when trends suggest “affordability will remain a contracting priority”.70 The competing 
mandates of provable year-to-year cost savings and expected increased procurement cost 
in complex IT under the new policy may prove insurmountable.  
In addition to misaligned incentives, the size of the acquisition workforce has 
shrunk over the past few years, possibly inhibiting the administrative capacity in 
implementing an increased number of complex IT best value procurements. Modern 
procurement offices were beset by two subsequent trends- 20% staff reductions in the 
1990s, followed by the urgent need for procurement of technologically complex, 
especially defense-oriented systems following 9/11, without parallel training in 
technology best suited for government missions.71 Also at play is the flight of 
procurement staff from the public to the private sector, especially in the uncertain
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budgetary climate of the late 2000s.72 The type of intensive training required for staff to 
internalize the nuances of complex IT, coupled with expanded procurement timelines 
should procurement officers begin to collaborate regularly with end-user clients, may be 
infeasible given the current workforce environment, without a corresponding influx of 
funding. The proposed policy does not seek to relieve this funding gap, unless managers 
divert funds away from other areas to fill the need.  
 While no new technology is strictly required by the proposal, the introduction of a 
new role tasked with measuring outcomes will require both monetary resources, as well 
as the formulation and implementation of a strategy to track outcomes. However, OMB 
suggested a comparable position in their June 2016 guidance on software licensing 
procurements, which called for the creation of a software manager role within 45 days to 
oversee all enterprise-level commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) IT purchases at each 
agency.73 The additional position may not represent an unorthodox request, especially 
given that the existence of the position is meant to provide actionable, empirical evidence 
linking LPTA usage to outcomes on an agency-customized level. However, combined 
with the stringency and limitations on the administrative capacity detailed above, the new 
role may prove difficult to source and adequately support.   
Political Analysis: 
Pros:  
There would likely be little contention regarding the authority or precedent of the 
OFPP to put forward such a policy. The office has published almost 50 such guideline
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letters to date, “stating principles that must be followed by the agencies and incorporated 
into the FAR, as necessary”.74 Rationale could be stated at the outset linking these new 
guidelines to OMB’s core responsibilities to moderate the course for federal procurement 
policy and ensure taxpayer money is effectively spent. OFPP could also present the 
document as a logically sequential follower to guidance released in June 2016 titled 
“Improving the Acquisition and Management of Common Information Technology: 
Software Licensing”.75 Complex IT projects, the focus of this study, are perhaps the most 
inappropriate application of LPTA. Therefore new guidelines should focus attention on 
best practices for using the best value continuum to procure more complex, customizable 
solutions as opposed to the “common” or COTS IT referenced in the June memo.  
In considering potential pushback from private sector stakeholders, IT industry 
contractors are unlikely to oppose attempts to reform LPTA, especially those geared 
towards significantly limiting its use. Industry leaders have been vociferously opposed to 
the trend favoring LPTA source selection and have long bemoaned its perceived 
longevity. A 2014 Washington Technology survey reported that LPTA is “nearly 
universally disliked,” with a full 89% of respondents stating opposition to its use.76 
Technology providers are concerned for their own business operations, as lower revenue 
forces reductions in staff and opportunities for fostering training opportunities that would 
increase competitiveness. Adjusting to the trend may also require unexpected 
expenditures in outside strategy consulting; judging by the plethora of articles and
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services offered to prepare businesses for adaptation to the environment, companies may 
face pressures to spend more to seek LPTA proposal-writing and competitive pricing 
expertise, adding costs with uncertain expectation of compensating revenue. 
However, respondents to the survey also note the impact that a decline in 
available expertise may have on government clients: “the government is surprised it is 
receiving junior staff where experience is needed…the customer expects the subject 
matter experts to return but under LPTA, these ‘greybeards’ are unaffordable”. 77 In a 
2016 letter to Senator John McCain, the Northern Virginia Technology Council, a 
powerful industry group representing some of the most prominent providers of Beltway-
region IT, raised fears that implorations such as Kendall’s memo had not sufficiently 
countered the trend, even in the defense sector where the most outspoken opponents have 
taken visible steps to mitigate it. To drive home their point, the Council cited key affected 
areas, set to only increase in federal mission importance over the next few years, 
including “cybersecurity, advanced data analytics, modeling and simulation, [and] 
robotics”.78 Industry support would help the FAR amendment pass through its statutory 
public comment period faster, and the private sector’s line of argumentation about 
diminishing institutional and technical knowledge may be a convincing political selling 
point, in a town so reliant on contractor support, especially for technically complex 
solutions.  
The proposal may be more likely to receive political buy-in from President 
Obama if presented as a way to remove barriers to small business and startup companies. 
The Obama administration has enacted policy in support for small and emerging business 
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throughout his tenure, overseeing 18 tax cuts and working closely with the Small 
Business Administration to ensure access to credit and government services, initiatives all 
aimed at reducing transaction costs and information asymmetry obstacles for these 
entities.79 The issue of LPTA could reasonably be posited as a problem 
disproportionately affecting small businesses and startups, rendering the proposal a 
logical offering from an administration already focused on assisting their growth and 
success. Evidence from the 2014 industry survey corroborates this way of framing the 
problem; respondents cited a perception that small businesses experience a greater impact 
from LPTA than either their large or mid-sized counterparts. One commenter laid out a 
detrimental spiral faced by small and startup companies in the current environment: “we 
do not have the expendable overhead that the large primes have. We also cannot keep 
people on the bench because we do not have any place to put them and then they file 
unemployment so we lose their billable income and [then] we have additional costs”.80 In 
light of this narrative, the potential advantages of the proposal dovetail with pre-existing 
administration policy, and could help avoid administrative blockers from the highest 
levels of the executive, if not engender vocal support from the same. 
The proposal also carries the advantage of relative ease of enactment, compared 
to other potential options including legislation. Legislation in general may be perceived 
ultimately as more legitimate, based on deliberation among more parties with diverse 
interests, however, given the timeline, the Obama administration is perhaps less likely to 
expend the political capital to try to put forth and rally support for legislation in this lame 
duck period at the end of his second presidential term. A regulatory push avoids such 
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expenditure, and, in light of the flurry of early-2016 defense legislative attention, may not 
receive much pushback from Congressional observers. Support from key personalities on 
the issue, such as Senator John McCain, who advocated the passage of LPTA reform 
provisions as introduced in the bipartisan “Promoting Value Based Defense Procurement 
Act” signals an awareness within the legislative branch that the problem exists and that 
the time is right for action. Given that such legislation has stalled in Congress, and that 
existing legislation only covered defense-sector procurement, to the exclusion of civilian 
agencies, a more comprehensive FAR-level OMB directive change may be welcomed by 
both the executive and legislative branches at this time. 
Another helpful factor in the political sphere is the visible push in the DOD space 
to acknowledge and fix the problem. Defense issues tend to rise to the top of Washington 
policy agenda due to their national security implications, and LPTA is well-poised to 
capitalize on this attention. The voices of defense procurement leaders like Kendall, 
Estevez and Grady have combined with political backers from bipartisan, defense-
oriented Congressional blocs to identify solutions including increased clarification of 
intended LPTA thresholds and appropriate use. The political zeitgeist may be primed for 
decisive action prior to the entrance of new players in both the executive and legislative 
branches come January 2017. 
The intent of the proposal also dovetails with the Obama administration’s 
demonstrated desire to set the tone of how the government utilizes technology generally, 
as well as its push to increase transparency in government spending practices. The current 
administration has been credited with encouraging competitive innovation in the IT 
sector, a value lost when LPTA overshadows technical solutions best matched to the 
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missions of modern government. In an October 2015 release, the administration 
announced its “Strategy for American Innovation”, which praises the ability of 
technology “to improve public services, grow the economy, improve the health and safety 
of our community, and promote scientific discovery”.81 The initiative links high-powered 
computing to national goals in a wide range of policy areas from education to national 
security, emphasizing the value of the very complex technology discouraged by LPTA. In 
2014 Obama signed into law The Digital Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA 
Act), which among several requirements, establishes the expectation that agencies will 
publish publically their expenditures including procurement activities.82 This legislation 
clearly emphasizes accountability to the public, which would only be bolstered by the 
proposed creation of a Source Selection Outcomes Advisor. This new procurement role 
will empirically track the life cycle of LPTA versus best value contracts, and be able to 
prove that the change orders, unexpected O&M and shifting requirements common to 
complex IT work render LPTA more expensive over the long term.  
Cons:  
 The single biggest obstacle to the success of the proposed is an ingrained political 
culture that repudiates long-term thinking in favor of short-term victories. The electoral 
concerns of both executive and legislative oversight players are key to the LPTA 
narrative, as public opinion deriding Washington profligacy precipitated the initial 
budgetary constrictions like sequestration, highlighted in previous sections. Due to the 
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political constraints inherent to their jobs, policy makers are not typically long-term 
thinkers, and tend to want to focus on high profile, high-salience topics. Short term 
victories are prized, and thus the primary positive of the proposal- its potential for long-
term savings- is not likely to inspire traction among procurement management 
incentivized by political players to drive costs down as quickly as possible. Procurement 
professionals who may identify an area of increased value face organizational obstacles: 
one respondent to a 2012 Professional Services Council survey highlighted an example 
where “we have a tripwire policy now in place, so if you want to pay 10 percent more, it 
has to go to the highest levels for approval”.83 Thus top-down political pressure and 
increased scrutiny on spending incentivizes the status quo trend. The very fact that the 
largest dangers of LPTA lie in the long term, in costly re-work and contract 
modifications, could hobble comprehensive reform efforts before they get off the ground.  
 Another prohibitive political argument may be the narrative that increased 
reliance on LPTA is a logical government step, and should be treated by the IT 
contracting industry as a natural evolution of the business cycle in a government keenly 
aware of deficit and debt concerns. A 2015 Defense Acquisition University publication 
makes such a case, in an article subtitled “Why all the Debate?” The author downplays 
industry outcry, suggesting such pushback is natural whenever the private sector 
disagrees with procurement approaches: “we expect our industry partners to advocate 
against the use of LPTA when they believe the government would benefit from the higher 
performance levels they offer”.84 It is telling that such commentary is emerging from
                                                        
83 “The Balancing Act: Acquisition in an Unabated Crisis,” Professional Services Council in 
Collaboration with Grant Thornton December 2012, pg. 32 
https://www.pscouncil.org/c/p/ProcurementPolicySurvey/2012.aspx 
84 Scott R. Calisti, “Lowest Price Technically Acceptable: Why all the Debate?” 
37 
acquisition training organizations- this may signal a wider cultural disinclination among 
procurement management and COs to consider the use of LPTA a problem to be solved. 
Another observer in 2012 painted a picture of natural cycles based on budgetary 
environments, claiming “there has always been a pendulum swing (toward and away 
from LPTA)”, and the current trend will resolve itself if and when procurement officials 
perceive diminishing returns.85 
In terms of top-level buy-in, there is some evidence that President Obama would 
prefer to avoid micromanagement of federal procurement shops, despite the potentially 
appealing narrative of support to small and emerging businesses discussed above. The 
promising bipartisan language set to appear in the 2017 National Defense Acquisition Act 
cautioning LPTA use, came under fire from the White House as part of a set of 
regulations included in the bill aimed at curing perceived procurement ills. OMB itself 
spoke out on behalf of the administration in a written statement opposing “provisions that 
would  “micromanage” the Pentagon “with overly prescriptive organizational 
changes”’.86 The administration encouraged additional review and threatened veto of the 
existing language, exhibiting significant deference to the expertise and leadership of 
agency procurement offices. In a telling signal of the administration’s stance on the 
debate, praise was given to efforts such as the 2010 Better Buying Power initiative, which 
was one of the key cornerstones heralding the expansion and incentivization of LPTA 
use. Thus the Obama administration’s desire to promote agency deference from the top
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may discourage support for a government-wide shift in source selection prescriptions that 
would have ripple effects through all procurement departments both military and civilian.  
Within acquisition management circles, the explicit discouragement of LPTA in 
complex IT in favor of more complex best value solicitations may prove unpopular, since 
best value undoubtedly invites more protest and more unwanted visibility from oversight 
groups like GAO. The VATEP formula introduced by DOD, and formalized in defense 
source selection guides as of mid-2016, exemplifies the intense incentives faced by 
acquisition professionals to avoid protests. Procurement offices, beset by brain drain to 
the private sector and facing shrinking budgets, have become keenly aware that 
“agencies’ deviations from stated evaluation criteria are the most common reason for a 
sustained outcome” in favor of bidding contractors in formal protest proceedings.87 The 
implementation of VATEP is thus simultaneously a recognition that increased LPTA 
usage is here to stay, and an attempt to shield staff from questions about relative value 
SOW categories. In what is likely at least a partial nod to questionable procurement 
practices including the inappropriate application of LPTA use, a recent Congressional 
Research Service report stated that between FYs 2008 and 2014, government spending 
reduced by 25%, but the incidence of protests rose by 45%.88 Contractor confusion over 
work requirements and government analysis factors drive formal protests, and cost 
remains a useful lowest common denominator differentiator in a culture fearful of 
inciting complaint.
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Recommendation: 
I would recommend adopting this proposal and commencing the drafting of the 
OMB guidance memorandum. A critical mass of observed pitfalls associated with the use 
of LPTA for the sake of short-term frugality, including lengthy protests, expensive, 
unexpected contract modifications and O&M work, and loss in technological innovation 
and expertise, points to long-term savings potential of the proposal. Political and 
bureaucratic advocates in the defense sector have proven that acknowledgement of the 
problem contributes to greater awareness and declining use of LPTA procurement in 
DOD acquisition relative to civilian agencies. Because the OMB guidance is more 
clarification than an extreme change in policy, and reflects the original intention of the 
FAR LPTA source selection criteria, technical implementation should proceed relatively 
uncontested. 
The creation of a Source Selections Outcomes Advisor position tasked with 
linking procurements to outcomes good and bad is perhaps the most important aspect of 
the proposal, and remains so even if initial implementation of a switch from LPTA to best 
value proceeds slowly due to competing procurement management incentives. A lack of 
empirical data surrounding the issue is the single largest detriment to any argument for or 
against the status quo, and the installment of this new position at each agency should 
assist procurement shops to plan better and track the long term prospects of their choices. 
This would introduce a future-oriented consequentialism lacking in a political 
environment so driven by immediate and short-term budget cycles.  
Though the Obama administration may prefer to resist meddling in procurement 
“micromanagement,” the focus on complex IT differentiates and elevates the issue. The 
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intent of the proposal, which promotes long term cost savings correlated with more 
meaningful technical value, is strongly linked to the administration’s policies promoting 
small business, government procurement transparency, and technical creativity in the 
private sector. The administration can seamlessly present OMB’s guidance as part of a 
fight to preserve innovation and expertise. It is ultimately a timely opportunity to steer 
the definition of mission-critical value in a government increasingly reliant on technology 
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